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in Iraq: How an Outdated Doctrine
Has Become an Obstacle to
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By ROBERT D. TADLOCK*
THE FINAL CAUSE OF LAW is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence.1 Such is the
predicament of occupation law, the international legal doctrine con-
trolling the authority of an interim administration in an occupied ter-
ritory during a military occupation. 2 The doctrine's fundamental
purpose is to achieve a balance between restraining the conduct of an
occupying power, while simultaneously empowering an occupied pop-
ulation.3 To achieve this purpose, Article 43 of the Hague Conven-
tion,4 which codified the doctrine, states that an occupying interim
administration shall respect the laws of the occupied territory as they
existed prior to an invasion "unless absolutely prevented" from doing
so.5 Yet, considering the nature of modern international occupation,
occupation law no longer achieves this balance because the nine-
teenth century social and political institutions that drove the doc-
trine's development are not applicable to twenty-first century society.
In modern occupations, often the sole motivation for invasion is to
transform the whole of a society. Therefore, occupation law's prohibi-
tion against allowing an occupier to change any law of an occupied
territory is simply no longer a cogent, sensible, or functional limita-
* Class of 2005. B.A., University of Washington (1999). Comments Editor, U.S.F.
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1. See BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (Yale Univ.
Press 1921).
2. See David Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 842 (2003).
3. Davis P. Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupa-
tion, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1582 (1985).
4. See Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
5. Id.
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tion. Indeed, in a modern occupation, Article 43's uncertain reach
hinders the occupied population's prospects for recovery.
The doctrine, scarcely applied during the twentieth century, has
re-emerged as the international community increasingly uses military
force to induce structural transformations of oppressive governments.
Because of this scarce application, occupation law, however, has not
adapted to several significant economic and societal developments.
Chief among these developments, and the focus of this Comment, is
the emergence of foreign investment as a linchpin of modern interna-
tional economics. 6
The importance of foreign investment's role in developing coun-
tries cannot be overstated. It is widely recognized that, if properly har-
nessed, foreign investment brought by multinational corporations
from developed countries benefits the growth and restructuring of a
state's developing economy.7 The United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") estimates that foreign affiliates
of nearly sixty-four thousand multinational corporations generate
over fifty-three million jobs worldwide, accounting for the largest
source of external financing in developing countries.8 In fact, today
the inward flow of foreign capital through equity in local companies,
reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans (foreign direct invest-
6. Foreign direct investment ("FDI"), used in this Comment interchangeably with
foreign investment, involves the creation of new businesses or investment in existing busi-
nesses in a country other than the home country of the corporation. 2 RALPH H. FOLSOM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 25.1, at 277 (2d ed. 2002). The investment in-
cludes capital transfer to underwrite a newly created entity, creating a long-term relation-
ship and reflecting a lasting interest. See id. "It means ownership and control of the
enterprise abroad." Id.; see also PFIZER CORP., WHO WE ARE, ABOUT PFIZER, at http://www.
pfizer.com/are/mnaboutall.html#worldwide (last accessed Sept. 17, 2004). Pfizer is a
company headquartered in New York that discovers, develops, and manufactures prescrip-
tion medicine. On its website the company lists three American locations and thirty-four
foreign manufacturing and research and development locations in, inter alia, Brazil, China,
Hungary, Philippines, Senegal, and Turkey. Id.
7. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 94 (1994). The-
oretical conflicts marked the growth of foreign investment law. The classical theory of in-
vestment, endorsed primarily by capital-exporting developed countries, took the position
that foreign investment was wholly beneficial to the host state. Id. at 38-43. In'contrast, the
dependency theory endorsed by capital-importing developing countries, argued that for-
eign investment relegated the host's economy to a subservient, peripheral status in the
world economy. Id. at 43-45. Most modern thought takes a middle road, attempting to
harness foreign investment to maximize benefits while concurrenly working to reduce
potential negative side effects. Id. at 45-50.
8. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. ("UNCTAD"), FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?inltemD=2527&lang=l
(last accessed Sept. 5, 2004). UNCTAD analyzes FDI trends, compiles FDI data, and pro-
vides training on international investment issues. Id.
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ment) amounts to one-third of developing countries' gross domestic
product ("GDP"), compared to just ten percent in 1980.9
Foreign investment has become crucial to enhancing and mod-
ernizing the critical areas of infrastructure that create the foundation
of a developing country's economy, such as energy production, tele-
communications, and transportation.' 0 Additional economic benefits
of foreign investment for developing countries include the efficient
use of resources, technology transfer (including organizational and
managerial skills), positive employment effects (jobs are created,
though generally after an initial rise in unemployment), and im-
proved productivity of local firms."
Occupation law's failure to account for the importance of foreign
investment in developing economies has created a problem in mod-
ern occupation. Modern occupation is frequently undertaken to trans-
form the occupied society. 12 Therefore, the occupier is often
attempting to rehabilitate a society as a whole. This likely requires the
modernization of oppressive political and legal structures. Yet, occu-
pation law persists in circumscribing change in a territory's law "unless
absolutely prevented," thus restricting the latitude necessary to effec-
tively steer an occupied territory into modern international econom-
ics. Considering the importance of foreign investment in such a
transition, the uncertain legal authority of an interim administration
to change foreign investment laws is a detriment to an occupied
population.
Iraq, after the American-led invasion of March 2003, is a clear
example of occupation law's failure. In September 2003, Iraq's Fi-
nance Minister Kamel al-Kailani announced United States-authorized
economic reform measures that abolished almost all restrictions on
foreign direct investment.1 3 The measures, instituted by the American
interim administration, the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"),
were intended to unravel the foreign investment restrictions instituted
by the former regime and trigger a flow of foreign investment. 14 The
9. Id.
10. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features of a Foreign In-
vestment Code for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 511, 533
(1995).
11. Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?,
24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 77, 144-45 (2003).
12. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 7-8 (1993).
13. See Sacha Baggili, State Drug Manufacturer in Iraq Likely to Seek Joint Venture Agree-
ments, WORLD MARKETS RES. CENTRE LIMITED, Jan. 12, 2004, at *2, at 2004 WL 57257251
(last accessed Sept. 5, 2004).
14. Id.
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United States role in drafting economic measures sparked considera-
ble controversy however, and international concern persists over the
validity of economic measures implemented prior to the establish-
ment of a fully sovereign Iraqi government. 15
The medical and pharmaceutical supply industries' attempts to
attract foreign investment highlight the legal uncertainty that occupa-
tion law has created for foreign investors attempting to invest in occu-
pied Iraq. Nearly a year after the American-led invasion, the State
Company for Drugs and Medical Supplies ("SCDMS") announced
plans to strike new marketing and distribution deals with foreign drug
manufacturers and producers of other medical supplies.1 6 Since the
end of major combat in May 2003, the country is critically short of
pharmaceutical products despite soaring demand.1 7 Thus, local phar-
macists and health officials view privatization and foreign investment
in the industry as the key to igniting the production of high-quality
drug supplies from a collapsed manufacturing infrastructure.18
Privatization and the introduction of foreign investment to the
Iraqi market, as SCDMS has proposed, would, however, effect a radi-
cal change in Iraq. Prior to the invasion, Saddam Hussein ("Hussein")
and his regime controlled a highly centralized drug market and the
private sector pharmaceutical industry was extremely restricted, oper-
ating only on a minimal, ad hoc basis.19 Under United Nations
("UN") sanctions-a consequence of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait-
import restrictions on technology,' mechanical equipment, and other
materials needed for drug manufacturing severely hampered the
country's state manufacturing facilities. 20 The proposed privatization
would open considerable opportunities for foreign direct investment
and would allow foreign multinational drug manufacturers the oppor-
tunity to establish a permanent presence in an as-yet untapped drug
market.2 1
Yet, with the shape of Iraq's political future still insecure, foreign
pharmaceutical corporations are currently hesitant to commit capital
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needs. 22 Though foreign manufacturers may enter into marketing
agreements with state companies such as SCDMS for the sale and dis-
tribution of their products in Iraq, these relationships are highly un-
likely to develop into a catalyst for greater foreign direct investment in
manufacturing, which at a minimum requires a stable and predictable
legal framework regarding foreign investment. 23 As a result, Iraqi
companies are unable to attract the expertise, technology, and fund-
ing that foreign investment supplies. In turn, the companies are una-
ble to meet the increasing demand of the Iraqi population. 24
SCDMS is indicative of a larger problem in Iraq. In order to meet
growing demand, both state-run companies and private companies in
vital sectors are seeking foreign investment to ignite their produc-
tion.25 Yet, more than a year after the end of official combat, foreign
investment remains largely absent in Iraq.2 6 A significant reason: occu-
pation law prevents legal certainty in the CPA's changes to Iraq's for-
eign investment code. Foreign corporations are concerned that their
capital will receive no legal protection once it is invested in Iraq.
It is against this backdrop-an emaciated economy starved under
Hussein's rule, occupied by a foreign military, and struggling back to
life-that the inquiry begins into why the century old doctrine of oc-
cupation law prevents legal certainty in an occupied territory's foreign
investment law. Clearly, the current violence in Iraq is a threshold is-
sue for foreign investors; however, in occupied and transitional socie-
ties generally, economic growth and military insecurity are related
concerns. 27 This Comment concludes that the international legal doc-
trine that controlled the United States occupation in Iraq is an obsta-
22. See id. (predicting that uncertainties in the state of Iraqi law will likely forestall
foreign direct investment for at least two years).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Neela Banerjee &John H. Cushman Jr., The Strugglefor Iraq: The Econ-
omy; Unemployed Iraqis Say New Jobs Will Pay Off in Greater Security for A14 N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2004, at Al1 (discussing Iraqi desire for foreign investment and estimates of market growth
in Iraq).
26. See id.
27. Indeed, this phenomenon is already apparent in Iraq. Banerjee and Cushman
state:
The economy [in Iraq], like the guerilla war that is holding it back, cannot be
measured as much as sensed. But on one question, bankers and borrowers,
soldiers and Iraqi politicians, day laborers and urbane professionals all agree: eco-
nomic recovery and security are inextricably linked. In a recent poll of Iraqis ....
98 percent of those responding said creating more jobs would be "very effective"
in improving security.
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cle to protecting the foreign investment that is so desperately needed
in Iraq's transitional economy. Thus, with Iraq as the example, this
Comment advocates fundamental alterations to occupation law re-
garding the ability of an occupier to change foreign investment laws.
These changes would realign the doctrine's fundamental purpose-
protection and empowerment of an occupied population-with the
modern realities of occupation and international economics.
Part I of this Comment examines why occupation law governs the
legality of the American dominated occupation. The doctrine's his-
tory and development are then discussed. Part II describes occupation
law's contribution to the uncertain effect of the CPA's liberal foreign
investment orders, particularly Order 39,28 that alter previous Iraqi
commercial law. The section establishes that occupation law's influ-
ence on the enforcement of occupied Iraq's foreign investment code
renders traditional contractual protections used by foreign investors,
such as stabilization clauses, an ineffectual means of mitigating against
the risks of investment.
Finally, in Part III, this Comment concludes that in order to
achieve occupation law's objective of restraining an occupier's power
while empowering the occupied population, the doctrine's restric-
tions preventing an occupying power from changing the foreign in-
vestment laws of an occupied territory must be relaxed. In light of the
transformational motives of modern occupation and the pervasiveness
of foreign direct investment in developing economies, this section
shows that an occupier must be able to create a stable legal regime for
foreign investment. To achieve the proper balance between re-
straining the occupier's power and empowering the occupied popula-
tion, the political structures and foreign investment codes of
neighboring similar countries should be examined and combined to
establish a "lowest common denominator" limit on the ability of an
occupier to change foreign investment law, thus creating a balance
between the need to allow the legal changes required to attract for-
eign investment and the need to respect the inherent sovereignty of
an occupied population. As an illustration of this principle, the for-
eign investment codes of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan are examined
as a means of creating a lowest common denominator for foreign in-
vestment in Iraq. This Comment ultimately concludes that the pro-
posed lowest common denominator of foreign investment in Iraq is
28. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 39 (2003), at http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations/20031220_CPAORD-39 ForeignInvestment.pdf (last accessed Sept. 5,
2004).
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strikingly similar to the foreign investment law implemented by the
CPA.
I. The Occupation of Iraq
To frame the impact that foreign investment has had on the mod-
ern application of occupation law, it is important to understand the
manner in which occupation law is imposed and the societal structure
that drove its origination. The United Nations Security Council's ("Se-
curity Council") failure to legitimize America's invasion of Iraq
through a formal resolution and the resultant imposition of occupa-
tion law in Iraq, as well as the doctrine's uneven application histori-
cally, highlight that there is no standard formula for how, when, or to
what extent occupation law will apply in the context of modern occu-
pations. Further, the nineteenth century origins of the doctrine illus-
trate its modern failure. These issues are discussed in this section.
A. Legality of the American Dominated Occupation
In March 2003, American, British, and Allied forces invaded Iraq
to depose Hussein's government. Whatever the legality of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, 29 when the United States and its allies exercised con-
trol over Iraqi territory, occupation law immediately applied to their
subsequent actions, including repairing destroyed infrastructure,
managing Iraq's significant oil industry, punishing war criminals, al-
tering Iraqi law, and handing power back to a sovereign Iraqi
government.30
The United States government strongly opposed UN control over
any post-war occupation of Iraq.3 1 The application of occupation law
in Iraq, coupled with America's desire to maintain control of the oc-
cupation, had profound implications for the American CPA.3 2 Had a
29. CompareJames C. Ho, International Law and the Liberation of Iraq, 8 TEX. REv. L. &
POL. 79, 80-83 (2003) (arguing that the United States had the legal authority to invade
Iraq under existing United Nations Security Council Resolutions 678 and 1441, as well as
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes anticipatory self-defense), with
Ben Saul, The Legality of the Use of Force Against Iraq in 2003: Did the Coalition Defend or Defy the
United Nations?, 8 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 267, 273 (2003) (contending that the
justification for the use of force was "based on a loose and overly permissive interpretation
of textual provisions in [Security] Council resolutions").
30. See Scheffer, supra note 2.
31. See id. at 850.
32. See id. at 843. Conspicuously absent, however, from the Security Council Resolu-
tion authorizing the American occupation is a method of accountability. SeeJames Thuo
Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Compar-
ative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 537 (2004).
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Security Council Resolution authorized a UN-controlled civilian ad-
ministration, as was done in Kosovo,33 the new civilian authority could
have undertaken the transformational tasks of enhancing the humani-
tarian, political, and economic well-being of the Iraqi people with un-
questioned legal authority.3 4 Instead, on May 22, 2003 the Security
Council, acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter,35 passed Resolu-
tion 1483 "recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and
obligations under applicable international law of these states as occu-
pying powers," 36 which it then specified as "in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907." 37 This cre-
ated a hybrid resolution, legitimizing and empowering the United
States actions and occupation, while simultaneously proscribing cer-
tain actions outside of the restrictive occupation law doctrine.
3 8
Though several occupations have taken place since 1990, includ-
ing those under UN-supported humanitarian intervention, Iraq is the
first time that the Security Council has resorted to occupation law to
govern a foreign military's control of an occupied area.3 9 Thus, al-
though the CPA was charged with transforming Iraqi society, it was
explicitly constrained by the very provisions of occupation law that the
Security Council omitted in empowering the interim administration
in, for example, Kosovo. The Security Council applied a legal straight
jacket, even while it authorized the CPA to steer Iraq's transformation
33. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., 10-11, S/RES/1244 (1999) (au-
thorizing Kosovo civilian administration with no mention of "applicable international
law").
34. See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 850; U.N. CHARTER art. 103 ("In the event of a con-
flict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail."). The U.N. Charter is available in 1 A COMPREHEN-
SIVE HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS: DOCUMENTARY PRESENTATION IN Two VOLUMES
107 (Min-Chuan Ku ed., 1978).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to require
states to comply with its resolutions. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1-2.
36. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg., at 2, S/RES/1483 (2003).
37. Id.; see also, Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 823, 824-25 (2003) (examining the adoption of Resolution 1483 by the
Security Council and the authority that was established by the Resolution).
38. See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 852. Indeed, Resolution 1483 may have thrown the
complete blanket of occupation law over the United States, where it may not have univer-
sally applied. Occupation law is not a preemptory norm of international law because of the
varying circumstances of occupation; all provisions are not always applied. By explicitly
articulating that the international law of occupation applies in Iraq, however, the Security
Council restricted the United States option of claiming exceptions to the full doctrine. See
generally id. at 844-47.
39. See Eyal Benvenisti, Water Conflicts During the Occupation ofIraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
860, 861 (2003).
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from dictatorship to representative government. The legal constraints
placed on the CPA through occupation law significantly limited the
ability of the CPA to establish the necessary legal structure to secure
the foreign investment essential to a successful transformation of Iraq
from an occupied land to a newly independent nation. 40
B. The Development of Occupation Law
Signed on October 18, 1907, the Hague Convention IV Respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land 41 ("Hague Convention"),
codified the culmination of prescriptive efforts undertaken through-
out the nineteenth century by national courts, military manuals, non-
binding international instruments, and legal scholars.4 2 The Hague
Convention created the international legal doctrine of occupation
law. The doctrine rests upon the principle that the actual or
threatened use of force is an unacceptable means of attaining sover-
eignty over territory. 43 Because there is a general presumption against
occupation, the rules of occupation seek to strike a balance between
enabling an occupier to act, while also limiting an occupier's adminis-
trative powers as a means of preventing it from ignoring the welfare of
the occupied population.44
The drafters designed the Hague Convention to control short-
term occupations after a military conquest and before the signing of a
peace treaty, at which time a defeated government would resume sov-
ereignty.45 The clear separation between ruling governments and eve-
ryday economic and social concerns of nineteenth century European
society shaped the Hague Convention. 46 Sovereign governments
fought one another, but fundamental structures of sovereign states
40. A fair response is that this issue is moot so long as the United States goes to the
UN before occupying another country. Given the United States "War on Terror" and the
tension on the Security Council resulting from the invasion of Iraq, however, the prospect
of future occupations governed by occupation law rather than a Security Council Resolu-
tion is not merely academic.
41. Hague Convention, supra note 4. See also Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupa-
tion: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 53 (1990), stating:
Whether or not a state is a party to [the Hague] Convention is of limited signifi-
cance, because the annexed Hague Regulations have since at least 1946 been
widely and authoritatively viewed as embodying customary international law [and
therefore binding on all states that have not persistently objected to the
Convention].
42. BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Goodman, supra note 3.
45. Id. at 1580-81.
46. Id. at 1591.
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did not differ radically, as many operated economies pursuant to the
same, general laissez-faire economic philosophies. 47 During a military
occupation, the ousted sovereign would merely wait beyond the occu-
pied borders, making his rightful return once the conflict ceased.48 At
the turn of the twentieth century the Hague Convention, in effect,
functioned as a pact between heads of state, providing that if one
leader was temporarily ousted, a trustee (the occupier) would manage
the territory before returning sovereignty to the rightful ruler once
hostilities ceased. 49
In the post-World War II occupations of Italy, Germany, and Ja-
pan the Allied powers claimed exceptions to the applicability of the
Hague Convention, compromising its status and authority.50 This
poor record of adherence led to the Fourth Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War5 1 ("Geneva
Convention"), which attempted to redefine occupation law and resus-
citate its waning influence. 52
The Geneva Convention recast the purpose of occupation law.
First, it delineated a bill of rights for the occupied population, creat-
ing a set of internationally approved guidelines for the lawful adminis-
tration of occupied territories. 53 Second, it shifted the emphasis from
political elites to society at large. 54 As a result, contemporary occupa-
tion law, guided by both the Hague and Geneva Conventions, focuses
on the interests of the indigenous community under occupation
rather than the wishes of the ousted government. 55 Concepts of self-
determination make the modern doctrine less an agreement among
sovereigns and more a tool for protecting and empowering the occu-
pied population. 56
The Hague and Geneva Conventions create a paradox of uncer-
tainty for a modern-day occupier. Despite the key role of economic
recovery in an overall reconstruction effort, neither of the Conven-
tions specifically address the precise extent of an occupier's power to
undertake economic development in occupied territories. Consider-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1580-81.
49. Id.
50. BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 59.
51. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
52. BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 59.
53. Id. at 105.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 6.
56. Id. at 6, 105.
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ing the role of economics in modern occupation, this failure signifi-
cantly undermines an occupier's attempts to spur economic recovery
and reform. Nonetheless, the Hague and Geneva Conventions pro-
vide the framework for evaluating an occupier's rights and duties to
develop the territory under its occupation by precluding legal changes
"unless absolutely prevented." 57 This incongruity is where the doc-
trine's failure to adjust to modern economic realities is most glaring
and most in need of significant realignment.
H. Law in Occupied Iraq: Did the CPA Have Authority to
Change Iraqi Foreign Investment Law?
"Everybody knows we cannot wait until there is an elected govern-
ment here to start economic reform .... The dilemma will be to
make changes in such a way that new laws will survive the elected
Iraqi government."58
Foreign investors are vital to modernize Iraq's economy and en-
sure the success of its new government. Yet, they are not investing
their capital and expertise in Iraq. For example, why has no major
foreign drug manufacturer signed a joint venture agreement with
SCDMS to build and operate a manufacturing facility in Iraq to meet
the demand of the Iraqi drug market? One reason is the lack of clear
legal protection for their investments against the political decisions of
a future Iraqi sovereign. Thus, the question is how the international
community can create as much legal certainty as possible for foreign
investment in occupied Iraq before the Iraqi people form their own
sovereign government. This section examines the uncertainty that re-
sults from the interplay between occupation law, CPA Orders, previ-
ous Iraqi Commercial Law, and stabilization clauses in "state
contracts" 59 that traditionally protect foreign investors from the subse-
quent political decisions of a host government. This section concludes
that the current legal regime that limits the ability of an occupier to
make necessary economic developments in an occupied territory fails
57. Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 221, 239 (1997).
58. Pratap Ravindran, The Arithmetic of Annexation, Bus. LINE, Sept. 12, 2003, at *2,
available at 2003 WL 62535660 (last accessed Sept. 5, 2004) (omission in original) (quoting
Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator, L. Paul Bremer).
59. State contracts are contracts between a foreign private legal individual and a state
controlled economic entity. Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International In-
vestment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX INT'L L.J. 215,
232 (1996).
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to account and allow for the foreign investment that is necessary for
the successful transition from a once-occupied state to sovereignty.
A. Article 43 of the Hague Convention
Section III, Article 43 of the Hague Convention states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force
in the country.60
Read strictly, the CPA had to respect Iraqi constitutional and
commercial law as it stood before the invasion unless absolutely criti-
cal to its own security.6 1 Thus, occupation law prevented the CPA
from changing local law even if change was needed to begin eco-
nomic development.62 An examination of CPA Orders and Iraqi com-
mercial law shows that, despite this seeming restriction, the CPA
deviated from Article 43.
B. Conflicting Law in Post-Invasion Iraq: CPA Orders Versus Iraqi
Commercial Law
Before Hussein's assent to power, Iraq had the most progressive
legal regime in the Middle East.63 Hussein's domination of the Iraqi
economy and over a decade of sanctions, however, resulted in the
stagnation of Iraq's commercial code, including its foreign investment
law. The result is an economy in disrepair, characterized by a glut of
inefficient state run companies that dominate several key industries.
During the occupation, the CPA assumed law-making power and en-
acted sweeping changes to several areas of law, including CPA Order
39,64 which overhauled Iraq's foreign investment law, particularly The
Companies Law 21 of 199765 ("the Companies Law"). The questiona-
60. Hague Convention, supra note 4, at art. 43.
61. Part II.D further explores how previous tribunals have interpreted "absolutely pre-
vented." See infra Part II.D.
62. See Goodman, supra note 3, at 1587.
63. See generally U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Overview of Commercial Law in Pre-War
Iraq I (Sept. 12, 2003) (draft), http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/iraq_commercial_law_
current.pdf (last accessed Sept. 5, 2004). Many basic elements of Iraqi contract law are
similar to those in Western legal systems. See id. at 4 (noting specific differences between
Iraqi contract law and Western legal systems). As an example, while many other Muslim
countries do not allow parties to charge interest, in Iraq this practice is permissible, al-
though limited in commercial and banking transactions. See id.
64. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 39, supra note 28.
65. Companies Law No. 21 of 1997 (1997) (Iraq), available at http://www.export.gov/
iraq/pdf/company-law-21_amended_2004.pdf (last accessed Sept. 5, 2004).
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ble authority of the CPA to change Iraq's foreign investment law com-
bined with the inherent conflict between Order 39 and the
Companies Law clearly creates uncertainty for investors.
1. Iraqi Commercial Code Before the Invasion
The Iraqi Civil Code is the primary source of Iraqi commercial
law, particularly regarding the formation, discharge, and dissolution
of contracts. In addition to the constitutional limitations of Article 18
prohibiting foreign ownership of "immovable property,"66 Iraqi com-
mercial law restricts non-Arab foreign corporations' access to the Iraqi
market.67
The Companies Law governs private sector corporate formation
in Iraq.68 Resident citizens of Arab countries are subject to "national
treatment" in many areas of Iraqi Law, including the Companies Law.
With respect to establishing, operating, or simply owning shares in an
Iraqi business, however, non-Arab foreigners are severely restricted
from accessing Iraq's market. Principally, under Article 12 of the
Companies Law, non-Arab residents may not be a founder, share-
holder, or partner in an Iraqi company.69
Foreign nationals from both Arab and non-Arab countries may,
however, participate in projects with Iraqi companies on a contractual
basis for the completion of a specific project so long as they do not
obtain any equity capital in the Iraqi company. 70 Additionally, foreign
companies carrying out activities in Iraq as part of an agreement with
an Iraqi government agency or with certain companies wholly or
partly owned by government entities may establish branch offices in
Iraq. 71 Initially, the non-Arab foreign company must certify with the
Registration of Companies Department in the Iraqi Ministry of Trade
that it complies with the Arab Boycott of Israel72 and that it will main-
66. INTERIM CONST. IRAQ art. 18 (1990), available at http://confinder.richmond.edu/
local iraql990.pdf (last accessed Sept. 5, 2004).
67. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 63, at 1, 6-8.
68. See id. at 5. The Companies Law allows for four main types of business entities: (1)
joint stock: five or more shareholders permitting public participation in which the liability
of each is limited to the nominal value of his share; (2) limited liability company: two to
twenty-five shareholders whose liability is limited to the nominal value of his share; (3)
collective partnership: two to ten natural persons with unlimited joint and personal liabil-
ity; and (4) individual enterprise: a single person with unlimited liability. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See id. at 6-7.
72. See generally MITCHELL BARD, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, THE ARAB BovcoTT (2004),
at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Arabboycott.html (last accessed
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tain its records in Arabic. 73 Branch offices may then conduct limited
business activities within the scope of approved contracts74 and must
employ at least two people, one of whom is an Iraqi.75 Under the
Companies Law, therefore, a non-Arab foreigner could not directly
invest in a company doing business in Iraq.
The example of SCDMS highlights the restrictions that the Com-
panies Law places on both Iraqi companies seeking foreign capital
and non-Arab foreign investors attempting to gain equity in an Iraqi
company. Because the Companies Law prohibits non-Arab foreign
ownership of an Iraqi company, it would be illegal for SCDMS to so-
licit a joint venture with non-Arab foreign pharmaceutical corpora-
tions to provide the capital, technology, and expertise needed to build
and operate a modern manufacturing facility. Furthermore, a non-
Arab foreign pharmaceutical company could not own equity in an
Iraqi company, limiting its profits and access to the Iraqi market to
distributorship and marketing deals specific to narrowly approved
projects with state-run companies. These are the very contracts that
the director of SCDMS criticizes as insufficient to meet current de-
mand.76 Finally, the Companies Law requires compliance with the
Arab Boycott of Israel, thus eliminating the capital and expertise of
nearly all North American, European, Asian, and African
corporations.
2. CPA Order 39
In contrast to the Companies Law, the CPA enacted Order 39,
completely overhauling Iraqi foreign investment law by eliminating al-
most all barriers to entry for outside investors. Additionally, it spurred
Sept. 5, 2004). The Arab Boycott is primarily a creation of the Arab League and has broken
down even among its own members following the Oslo Agreements of 1993. Nineteen
countries, however, met in April 2004 to discuss tightening the Boycott. See id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. Within the scope of the contract, representative offices may act as liaisons to
collect information, purchase tender documents, and contact clients with whom they have
an existing business relationship. Id.
75. Id. at 8.
76. An influx of humanitarian aid accompanied the violence of the invasion. See, e.g.,
Ariana Eunjung Cha, Iraqi Hospitals on Life Support; Babies Dying Because of Shortages of
Medicine and Supplies, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at Al. This additional supply only high-
lights SCDMS's problem. Once hostilities cease, and international aid decreases, the drop
in supply will only enlarge the gap between supply and demand. As such, the marketing
and licensing deals will enable SCDMS to supply that much less of the market. See generally
Baggili, supra note 13, at *2-*3.
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passage of other CPA Orders that further modify the legal require-
ments for forming a private business or establishing a branch office.
Order 39 "replaces all existing foreign investment law' 7 7 and enti-
ties foreign investors to legal protection "no less favorable than those
applicable to an Iraqi investor. '78 Moreover, Order 39 abolishes all
limits on the percentage of foreign ownership in a newly formed or
existing Iraqi business.79 Foreign investors may establish their pres-
ence in Iraq through a wholly owned subsidiary, a joint venture with
an Iraqi investor, a branch office, or a direct acquisition of an Iraqi
company.80 Finally, foreign investors may obtain full and immediate
payment of profits, shares, dividends, and proceeds from the sale or
other disposition of their foreign investments, interests, or royalties.81
There are no requirements that a foreign investor's profits remain in
Iraq.
Order 39 includes few limits on foreign investment. A foreign in-
vestor may not purchase the rights of disposal and usufruct of private
real property, though renewable forty-year licenses are available.8 2 Ad-
ditionally, Order 39 prohibits foreign ownership in three sectors of
the economy: the "natural resources sector,"83 the banking industry,
and the insurance industry.84
The CPA enacted other changes in the wake of Order 39. Order
64,85 which also significantly amends the Companies Law, allows a for-
eign or domestic juridical or natural person the right to acquire mem-
bership in an Iraqi company "as founder, shareholder, or partner. '86
Further, the Ministry of Trade, subject to authority granted by the
CPA, announced Ministerial Instruction No. 14987 ("Ministerial In-
struction"), governing the registration of branches and trade repre-
77. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 39, supra note 28, § 3(1).
78. Id. § 4(1).
79. Id. § 4(2).
80. Id. § 7(1).
81. Id. § 7(2)(d)(i)-(iii).
82. Id. § 8(1)-(2). Under the provision, however, a new Iraqi sovereign may review
even these renewable forty-year licenses. See id.
83. Id. § 6(1).
84. See id.
85. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 64 (2003), at http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations/20040305_CPAORD64_Amendment to-theCompanyLawNo._21_of_
1997_withAnnexA.pdf (last accessed Sept. 5, 2004).
86. Id. § 1(14).
87. Republic of Iraq Ministry of Trade, Ministerial Instruction No. 149, Registration of
Branches and Trade Representation Offices by Foreign Companies (Feb. 29, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/instructions-registration-foreign_0204.pdf (last ac-
cessed Sept. 5, 2004).
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sentation offices by foreign companies.88 Following the dictates of
Order 39, the Ministerial Instruction allows a branch office to operate
in the name of a business entity organized under the laws of a foreign
country and prohibits a business's foreign character from disqualify-
ing its registration to conduct business in Iraq.89
Order 39 and its progeny completely overhaul Iraqi commercial
law, in particular, its foreign investment law. Iraqi companies are now
more freely able to enlist foreign investment to meet Iraqi demand.
There are no longer restrictions on foreign ownership of Iraqi busi-
nesses, and foreign corporations may immediately repatriate profits.
Also eliminated are requirements that foreign companies abide by the
Arab Boycott of Israel. A foreign investor now receives the same treat-
ment in an Iraqi court as an Iraqi business owner.
Again, SCDMS is instructive when examining the efficacy of these
changes. If Order 39 controls, SCDMS may solicit foreign investment
from the most efficient bidder in order to attract the capital, technol-
ogy, and expertise to build the manufacturing infrastructure necessary
to meet the demands of the Iraqi market. A foreign corporation can
now own all or part of SCDMS. As an owner, a foreign corporation
may make the decisions necessary to build the proper manufacturing
infrastructure, as well as decide how best to market and distribute
products. Additionally, the foreign investor will have legal protection
in Iraqi courts for the enforcement of its contracts and protection of
its profits, making the risks of the Iraqi market more tolerable. For-
eign corporate ownership stands on the same footing as Iraqi owner-
ship. Although the registration process for branch offices remains
difficult, its functions are no longer restricted to communication re-
garding a specific project.
Yet, Order 39 remains questionable under occupation law. Article
43 of the Hague Convention requires an occupier to honor the ex-
isting law of an occupied territory "unless absolutely prevented" from
doing so. Therefore, the CPA's legal authority to undertake this over-
haul of Iraq's foreign investment code is uncertain under Article 43,
leaving foreign investors in a quandary. Do the provisions of Order 39
allow them to freely invest in the Iraqi market, or do the restrictions of
the Companies Law prevent the legal entrance of non-Arab foreign
capital? Will the new Iraqi government use this legal uncertainty as a
political tool if it does not want to uphold the terms of a contract
88. Id. § 1(1).
89. Id. § 1(2).
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between a foreign investor and a state-run or private company that was
signed under CPA authority, before the new Iraqi government came
into power?
C. Impact on Stabilization Clauses: Traditional Contractual
Provisions Protecting Foreign Investment from Political
Risk Do Not Solve Uncertainty
The legal uncertainty in Iraq has a profound impact on foreign
investors seeking to enter the Iraqi market. Foreign investors often
encounter both legal and political uncertainty when investing in de-
veloping countries with transitional economies. Thus, in today's mod-
em economic framework, where a government lacks the functioning
internal mechanisms of sovereignty such as law and order and an in-
dependent and effective judicial system, a foreign investor will com-
monly use contractual provisions to protect against risk.90
Unfortunately, these contractual clauses are not likely to be an effec-
tive means of mitigating against risk in Iraq.
Primary among the clause typically included in a foreign inves-
tor's contract with a "host" government are stabilization clauses-con-
tractual provisions that specifically address political risk.9 1 These
clauses have at least three dimensions: international, contractual, and
governmental.9 2 The clause creates an "anchor" law that neutralizes
the host state's sovereign legislative power to affect any contractual
right or property right located in its territory.9 3 Generally, stabilization
clauses provide that if any governmental action adversely affects the
economics of an agreement, the parties will readjust the terms to re-
turn the parties to their respective financial positions as they existed at
the time the agreement was signed.9 4 Specifically of concern to for-
90. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 59, at 223.
91. See Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions,
30 DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 217, 220-23 (2002); Waelde & Ndi, supra note 59. Stabilization
clauses are one of many tools that protect international investments. Id. Other contractual
tools include choice of law clauses, arbitration clauses, and renegotiation clauses. Coale,
supra, at 220 n.23. Additionally, governments may provide insurance for managing the
risks of foreign direct investment. For example, in the United States the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation is a statutorily-created government agency that serves this func-
tion. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-99; 2 FOLsoM, supra note 6, § 25.1, at 641-49.
92. Danielle Mazzini, Stable International Contracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered
Species?, 15 B.U. IN'r'L L.J. 343, 345 (1997).
93. SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 328 (1994).
94. R. Doak Bishop, Sashe D. Dimitroff & Craig S. Miles, Strategic Options Available
When Catastrophe Strikes the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 635, 641
(2001).
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eign investors are: (1) laws regulating a country's fiscal regime, includ-
ing tax laws and foreign investment laws concerning limits on access
to the domestic market; (2) contractual and proprietary rights and
titles; (3) the ability to sell and repatriate profits earned; and (4) la-
bor, safety, and environmental standards consistent with international
norms.
95
Stabilization clauses are not foolproof and do not protect against
all risk. Agreements with governments, particularly regarding issues
that the government or its instrumentalities have no power of commit-
ment over, are inherently unsafe.96 This creates enormous ambiguity
in an occupied country, like Iraq, where an interim administration
makes significant legal changes. To the extent a foreign investor can
perform due diligence to ascertain the validity of Iraq's national law,
there cannot be a legitimate expectation that a stabilization clause will
be enforced, particularly when negotiated in the face of the interim
government's questionable legal authority to agree to such clauses.
97
If the stabilization clause works to prevent a sovereign from ignoring
its contractual obligations, a foreign investor, knowing the legal un-
certainty Order 39 created under Article 43, cannot legitimately antic-
ipate that a future elected Iraqi government will respect the terms of
the contract. Without some guidance as to whether Order 39 is a "per-
mitted" anchor law of a stabilization clause under Article 43, foreign
investors will be unable to protect their investments through contrac-
tual terms.
This inherent insecurity lies at the heart of questions surround-
ing foreign investors' reliance on CPA Orders in Iraq. As a result of
Article 43, the interim government and the CPA have questionable
authority to agree to a contract with a foreign investor, restricted only
by the liberal provisions of Order 39. Clauses inserted into contracts
cannot modify occupation law's existing restrictions on the CPA to
respect, unless absolutely prevented, Iraqi law as it existed before the
occupation. Further, if the CPA Orders are not legitimate, a future
Iraqi government is not committed to refrain from exercising its sov-
ereign and legislative rights because of the requirements in a stabiliza-
tion clause. 98 Given this uncertainty, it is not surprising that foreign
investors are not rushing to invest in the Iraqi market.
95. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 59, at 220.
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D. No Clear Precedent Exists to Determine the Standards of
Article 43
Was Order 39 in accordance with Article 43 when it was
adopted?99 Whether stabilization clauses, signed pursuant to Order
39, protect a contract does not depend on the validity of the stabiliza-
tion clauses themselves. 10 0 Rather, their validity is dependent upon
the legitimacy of the anchor law. Thus, Order 39, the anchor law for
foreign investors in Iraq, determines the validity of the stabilization
clause. Therefore, an initial inquiry is necessary to determine whether
the CPA had the authority, as an interim administration under occu-
pation law, to create new laws that serve as the anchor law in a stabili-
zation clause.
There is no coherent analysis of the economic powers of occu-
pant legislators.10 1 This is due in large part to occupation law's uneven
application in the second half of the twentieth century, at the very
time when international economics began to fundamentally alter rela-
tionships between states. Despite the importance of economics in the
international community's increased interventions, the interrelation
between modern economics and occupation law is deficient because
Security Council Resolutions, which omit the more restrictive provi-
sions of occupation law, have governed most modern occupations.
Article 43 of the Hague Convention dictates that an occupier
must respect the laws in force prior to the occupation unless doing so
is "absolutely prevented. ' 10 2 The term "absolutely prevented" has
never been literally interpreted. 10 3 In the least, it means that new laws
may only supplement existing law and must satisfy Article 43's require-
ments, and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the domestic
law in place before an invasion and against any contrary orders imple-
mented by the occupant. 10 4 Considering the fluidity and pace of mod-
99. See ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 145 (photo. reprint 1971) (1942) (arguing that when examining an occupa-
tion "[t]he most important consideration ... is that of international legality: Were the
measures of the occupant in accordance with international law when they were adopted?").
100. See, e.g., Mazzini, supra note 92, at 369 (quoting an international arbitration pro-
ceeding between Texaco and Libya: "'[A] State cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard
commitments freely undertaken through the exercise of this same sovereignty and cannot,
through measures belonging to its internal order, make null and void the rights of the
contracting party which has performed its various obligations under a contract.'").
101. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 99, at 87.
102. Hague Convention, supra note 4, at art. 43.
103. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 99, at 89.
104. Id.
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ern society, the precedent of Article 43 provides no clear answer
regarding the legality of an occupant order. 10 5
Following an occupation, the return of an occupied territory to
full sovereignty creates a new 'jurisdiction" in which occupation mea-
sures may be rescinded, recognized, or given a final force that they
did not possess during the occupation. 10 6 Indeed, after an occupation
the new sovereign has wide latitude to rescind occupation-time orders
that modify private contractual relationships.1 0 7 In countries whose
courts have judged the validity of laws created during an occupation,
Article 43 serves as an important standard of the law's viability after
the occupation. Historically, there is a strong tendency to recognize as
"permitted," viz., enforceable, those acts that meet international legal-
ity under Article 43 and to find unenforceable those that do not.108
Though international tribunal precedent is scarce regarding which
acts are "permitted" under Article 43, two courts have analyzed how
an occupant's economic regulations affect private interests.
First, following the German occupation during World War I, Bel-
gian mixed arbitral tribunals decided several cases relating to eco-
nomic regulations imposed by the Germans during the occupation. In
1918, the Court of Appeals of Brussels upheld a German decree regu-
lating the exorbitant price of produce. 10 9 The court found that by en-
acting the decree, the German occupant had "'acted in the place of
the legitimate authority which for the time being had been ousted,
and in conformity with the provisions of Article 43.' '"110 In contrast,
the Court of Appeals of Liege refused to uphold any German decrees,
holding that they were never laws and that the German occupants had
no right to legislate.' Finally, in 1925, the Court of Appeals of Brus-
105. SeeJuLIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 698 (Rinehart &
Co., Inc. 1954); FEILCHENFELD, supra note 99, at 131 (stating a comprehensive law on occu-
pation would include, "[w]hat effect does a returning sovereign give to the acts of the
occupant?").
106. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 99, at 144.
107. See id. at 145, 147.
108. Id. at 147 (noting competing arguments prior to 1914). One school of thought
argued that all occupant decrees should be recognized because "social life would be para-
lyzed if people knew that the end of hostilities would mean a fatal dissolution of all results
of the occupation." Id. Yet another group, however, limited recognition to those permitted
decrees under international law, arguing that "'otherwise a few weeks' occupation might
possibly result in . . . obligations . . . which would prejudice the legal government for a
generation."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
109. Id. at 148.
110. Id. (quoting Bochart v. Comm. of Supplies of Corneux, No. 327, in ANN. DIG.
1919-22, (Ct. App. Liege, Fr. Feb. 28, 1920)).
111. Id.
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sels upheld a German decree increasing the cost of supplying gas,
holding that "'the circumstances of war-time, and particularly the in-
crease in the cost of raw materials and the necessity for providing the
needs of the population, in fact justified the measures taken by the
occupying authorities."' 112
The second tribunal to consider the application of Article 43 is
the Israeli Supreme Court, which has overseen the Israeli govern-
ment's occupation of the Palestinian territories since 1967.113 In light
of the many UN pronouncements asserting that Israel has very limited
economic rights in the occupied territories and condemning Israel for
alleged exploitation of resources, the Court has failed to establish a
clear line of precedent regarding Israeli conduct under Article 43.114
In a case arising from an employment dispute where an Israeli Re-
gional Commander issued an order amending the Jordanian law1 15
making it possible to appoint members of an arbitration council, the
court observed that an occupant has a duty to respect the occupied
population's welfare. 116 The Court held that an "'occupation brings
in its wake social, economic and commercial changes"' and, as such,
"'Article 43 should, therefore, be interpreted with reference to... the
duty to regulate economic and social affairs."'"11 7 The Court found the
proper inquiry to be "'whether the motive for the change was the fur-
therance of the occupant's interests or concern for the welfare of the
civilian population. "' 118 In the case of the arbitration panel, the order
was held to be not beyond the occupant's jurisdiction because it only
completed the machinery set up under Jordanian law, which would
not otherwise have been able to operate." 19
In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court also considered the Israeli
government's purchase of the company supplying electricity to the
West Bank. 120 The Court held that in the absence of special circum-
stances, an occupant should not introduce legal modifications, which,
112. Id. (quoting City of Malines v. Socit4 Centrale pour l'Exploitation du Gaz, No.
362, in ANN. DIG. 1925-26).
113. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 44, 88-89.
114. See id. at 91.
115. Jordan once controlled the Palestinian territories and, thus, the territory was once
under Jordanian law.
116. Roberts, supra note 41, at 91.
117. Id. (quoting Christian Soc'y for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense, No. H.C.
337/71, 26(1) Piskei Din 574 (1972), summarized in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354, 355 (1972)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 92.
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even if they do not alter existing law, would have a far-reaching and
prolonged impact on the occupied territory. 121
If the Iraqi courts, in a new 'Jurisdiction," or the International
Court of Justice ultimately hear a case interpreting Order 39 under
Article 43, the unclear precedents from both the Belgian and the Is-
raeli courts would provide no specific guidance. This is particularly
true because those courts did not make their decisions within the con-
text of the transformational nature of modern occupation. The prece-
dent from the Israeli court, specifically that an occupant should not
enact legal change that has a prolonged impact on the occupied soci-
ety, creates a paradox because those occupation measures that most
empower an occupied population, viz., those that fundamentally alter
the institutions of the occupied territory, are the same ones that are
most likely to have a prolonged impact. This empowerment and
change, in fact, is at the very core of what a modem occupation hopes
to achieve.
Further, these adjudications fail to address the primary concerns
of foreign investors, principally stability and investment protection,
because any decision will not come until after a sovereign Iraqi gov-
ernment is in place and accepts or repudiates the standards of Order
39. From the perspective of the foreign investor, the unclear substan-
tive standards of occupation law and the delayed adjudication resolv-
ing that uncertainty in Iraq are not simply a disincentive to invest-
they are a critical deficiency. 122
III. Effective Occupation Requires that an Occupier Have
Limited Authority to Change an Occupied
Territory's Foreign Investment Laws
Two conclusions arise from an analysis of the current status of
occupation law in the context of modern society. First, occupation law
should allow for an occupier's efforts to change, with certainty, ex-
isting foreign investment laws in the occupied territory in support of
an effort to initiate economic reform. Second, while an occupier
should have the power to change foreign investment laws, occupation
law should not be a carte blanche for the occupier. Rather, to achieve
its central balance between restraining an occupying power and em-
121. Id.
122. See Jack I. Garvey, Regional Free Trade Dispute Resolution as Means for Securing the
Middle East Peace Process, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 158 (1999) (arguing in the context of the
Palestinian Territories that a lack of substantive standards and a system to implement such
regulations creates a disincentive for foreign investment).
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powering an occupied population, occupation law should allow an oc-
cupying administration to implement foreign investment changes
only with reference to a "lowest common denominator" limiting prin-
ciple. This principle would allow the occupier to make only those le-
gal changes suggested by the prevailing foreign investment norms of
surrounding countries with similar social structures. Thus, in the in-
stance of Iraq, what is an acceptable level of change may be deter-
mined, in part, by the foreign investment codes of neighboring
countries with political institutions similar to those that a future Iraqi
government is likely to develop.
Such a fundamental change to occupation law is vital because
given the contemporary purpose of protecting an occupied popula-
tion and the importance of foreign investment in a successful transi-
tion from occupation, the doctrine's current restrictions are so far
removed from reality that even those nations inclined to obey the law
will find it difficult to do so. 12 3 The motivation and frequency of occu-
pations at the turn of the twenty-first century are in stark contrast to
the circumstances that gave rise to the Hague Convention in 1907 and
the Geneva Convention in 1949. First, occupation is now often an in-
ternational effort and, whatever the motivation, in few of these con-
flicts is there a government in exile waiting to return.124 Second,
foreign investment is now an integral part of a developing economy
and exists in even the most secluded countries of the world. 125 Be-
cause of these fundamental changes in the circumstances of occupa-
tion, occupation law must adapt to allow change to an occupied
territory's foreign investment laws.
A. Modem International Occupation
Modern occupation serves a completely different purpose today
than it did at the turn of the twentieth century or even following
World War II. As the law governing occupation, the guidelines of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions remain the controlling international
law, yet they fail to address the proper role of an occupier in the devel-
opment of economic, social, and educational infrastructures. In light
of the transformational motivation of modern occupation, this restric-
tion risks causing economic stagnation, the continued impoverish-
123. See Goodman, supra note 3, at 1607.
124. See id. at 1591.
125. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 92 (discussing the rise of foreign invest-
ment in developing states and the apparent inconsistency within these foreign investment
laws).
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ment and backwardness of an occupied population, and, conse-
quently, the ultimate failure of the occupation. 126
Modern occupation seeks to transform the very institutions that
occupation law has traditionally attempted to protect. However eco-
nomic globalization, transportation and communications advances,
and the spread of human rights law in the last half of the twentieth
century have resulted in the diminishing recognition of the very prin-
ciple of inviolable national sovereignty that is the foundation of occu-
pation law. 127 In addition to these broad trends, the end of the Cold
War reinvigorated multinational institutions such as the Security
Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"),
whose increased activity served only to accelerate the trend of dimin-
ishing inviolable sovereignty. 128 Indeed, most modern interventions
are responses to internal conflicts. The international community is be-
coming increasingly intolerant of atrocities committed on a scale that
imperils whole societies and of rulers who use repressive measures to
deny their own people the right to fair and representative govern-
ment.129 This is a fundamental change because as recently as the
1980s internal conflicts were considered untouchable on the theory
that intervening would violate sovereignty. As a signal of this change,
in early 1999 two separate interventions responded to internal vio-
lence. NATO responded to Yugoslav and Serbian forces entering the
separatist province of Kosovo with an eleven-week air attack. 130 Three
months later the Security Council authorized an international force to
enter East Timor to halt the violent attacks of Indonesian-supported
militias targeting those voting against the integration of East Timor
into Indonesia.' 3 '
The success of these interventions depended (and still does in
those interventions that are ongoing) largely on a close cooperation
between military and civilian actors, as well as the resources commit-
ted to the civilian effort.1 32 Despite the intense focus on the military
126. BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 105.
127. Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52
STAN. L. REV. 959, 959 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY (Princeton Univ. Press 1999)).
128. Jacob S. Kreilkamp, U.N. Postconflict Reconstruction, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
619, 639-44 (2003).
129. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 860.
130. HansjCrg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The U.N. and the Crea-
tion of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107,
107 (2001).
131. Id. at 107-08.
132. Id. at 120.
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aspects of these operations, modern interventions are complex, multi-
layered efforts extending well beyond the use of military power. 13 3 In
fact, military power is often the first phase of an engagement that
eventually results in a long-term international involvement in trans-
forming society, building institutions, and bringing about economic
stability.13 4
Occupation law was not designed for such transformational pur-
poses. 135 While the humanitarian conditions of the occupied society
are a paramount concern of the Hague and Geneva Conventions,
these regulations restrict the very institutional transformations that
mark modern occupations. An occupier that displaces a repressive
leader seeking to radically transform a society in political,judicial, and
economic collapse requires far more latitude for transformational de-
velopment than was anticipated under the conventions. 136
B. Foreign Investment in Occupied Economies
In order to attract foreign investment in occupied territories an
interim government must have latitude to create a clear legal re-
gime-one that foreign investors trust will guarantee access to the
market and investment protection. Indeed, the benefits of foreign di-
rect investment are precisely what countries emerging from a stag-
nated political, economic, and social infrastructure desperately
need. 137 Because fundamental change to society motivates modern oc-
cupation, an economy developing under occupation is undergoing
significant structural changes that make foreign investment a critical
133. Id.
134. Id. at 109-10 (discussing this in the context of Kosovo and East Timor).
135. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 849.
136. See id.
137. See Lieutenant Colonel Mark Martins, No Small Change of Soldiering: The Com-
mander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan, ARMY LAWYER, Feb. 2004,
at 1, 2 n.12. Economic success is a key ingredient to slowing insurgencies and the larger
overall goals of transition:
"Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular
support. The winner will be the party that better forms the issues, mobilizes
groups and forces around them, and develops programs that solve problems of
relative deprivation. This requires political, social, and economic development.
Security operations by military and police forces, combined with effective and
legitimate administration ofjustice, provide the necessary secure environment in
which development can occur."
Id. (quoting the U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support
Operations (2003)).
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component of the occupation.138 Both the Kosovo and Afghan in-
terim administrations faced this same issue and both passed liberal
foreign investment laws, demonstrating foreign investment's critical
role in developing an occupied economy.
Bitter debate surrounded reconstruction and privatization in Ko-
sovo following NATO's extensive bombing campaign in 1999.139 The
United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), man-
dated by Security Council Resolution 1244/1999,140 is notably not
bound by the restrictions of occupation law despite the fact that the
Security Council did not sanction NATO bombing. 141 UNMIK was
hesitant to privatize what was in essence seized state property, but de-
cided that the economic future of Kosovo was too important to wait
for a final peace settlement permanently establishing Kosovo's legal
status.1
42
In January 2001, Bernard Koucher, the Special Representative of
the Secretary General in Kosovo, signed Resolution No. 2001/3 "On
Foreign Investment In Kosovo. 143 Kosovo's revised foreign invest-
ment law states that its purpose "is to create certain legal guarantees
necessary to make Kosovo more attractive to foreign investment."1 44
The law guarantees foreign investors "national treatment,"145 while al-
lowing "wholly-own [ed] and wholly control [led] [foreign] business or-
ganizations in all sectors of the economy,"'146 except for a limit of
forty-nine percent foreign ownership in the manufacture and distribu-
tion of military products. 147 Finally, the revised law provides that "par-
ties to a foreign investment may specify any arbitration ... procedure
upon which they agree... [and] any judgment resulting from such an
138. See generally Kennedy, supra note 11, at 144-45 (discussing the economic benefits
of foreign investment accrued by the host economy); see also supra notes 5-10 and accom-
panying text.
139. Daphne Eviatar, Free-Market Iraq? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at B9.
140. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 33.
141. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 36. Compare id. (noting "obligations under applicable
international law of these states as occupying powers"), with S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 33
(stating no similar obligation under international law).
142. Eviatar, supra note 139. Foreign direct investment in the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia has increased from just under $100 million in 2000 to over $300 million in 2001.
Id.
143. U.N. Admin. Mission in Kosovo, Reg. 2001/3,Jan, 12, 2001, http://www.unmikon
line.org/regnlations/2001/reg3-Ol.html (last accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
144. Id. § 1.
145. Id. § 3.
146. Id. § 5.
147. Id. § 6.
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agreed procedure shall be . . . enforceable . . . in any . . . court of
competent jurisdiction in Kosovo."' 48
Likewise, in Afghanistan many experts considered an investment-
friendly environment the key to the survival of Hamid Karzai's interim
government. 149 The Afghan "Law on Domestic and Foreign Private
Investment"' 50 is strikingly similar to Kosovo's revised foreign invest-
ment law. The Afghan law's purpose is "to encourage and protect...
foreign private investment.' 5 1 The law provides foreign investment in
all sectors of the economy,152 one hundred percent foreign owner-
ship, 153 ten to thirty-year leases of real estate,1 54 complete repatriation
of profits, 155 and requires due process of law for appropriation and
just compensation if appropriation occurs. 156
Only limited foreign investment has come to Afghanistan follow-
ing the American invasion, due in large part to military instability.
1 57
Some foreign capital, however, is reaching Afghanistan. For example,
Afghan Wireless Communication Company, a joint venture between
an Afghan expatriate living in New York City and Karzai's interim gov-
ernment, has invested fifty million dollars to create a wireless cell
phone network in Kabul and four other cities.158 Additionally, the Hy-
att Corporation, along with three Turkish construction firms and the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Company, is planning a forty million dol-
lar five-star hotel across the street from the American Embassy.'
59
The new foreign investment laws in both Kosovo and Afghanistan
exemplify that one necessary component of successful transformation
under an occupying power is economic development and growth.
160
148. Id. § 17.
149. Kimberly Bayley, On Bringing Law to Damaged Lands: The Road Ahead in Afghanistan
and Iraq, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2004, http://www/abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2 0 0 4-Ol-
0 2 /
bayley.shtml (last accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
150. Law on Domestic and Foreign Private Investment in Afghanistan (2002) (Afg.),
http://www.moc.gov.af/govdoc/Private%201nvestment%2Law-IGoctO2.pdf (last accessed
Sept. 5, 2004).
151. Id. at art. 1.
152. Id. at art. 3.
153. Id. at art. 4.
154. Id. at art. 14.
155. Id. at art. 15.
156. Id. at art. 22.
157. See Marc W. Herold, Empty Hat: Foreign Investors Shun Karzai's Afghanistan, REvSTA
EsPAQo AcA.gMIco (Braz.), Oct. 2003, at http://www.espacoacademico.com.br/029/ 2 9
cherold.ing.htm (last accessed Aug. 27, 2004).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See MarshallJ. Breger & Shelby R. Quast, International Commercial Arbitration: A Case
Study of the Areas Under Control of the Palestinian Authority, 32 CASE W. Rs. J. INT'L L. 185, 187
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One of the principal requirements for this economic growth is foreign
investment. 161 The success in attracting foreign investors to both Ko-
sovo and Afghanistan evinces the benefits of creating more liberal for-
eign investment laws in occupied territories like Iraq and, as such,
highlights the need for occupation law to adapt in the face of this
modern reality.
C. A Limit on an Occupier's Power: Foreign Investment Laws of
Iraq's Neighbors
Though an occupying power must have the authority to alter an
occupied territory's foreign investment law, in order to achieve occu-
pation law's fundamental balance this authority must have limits. It
bears reminding that foreign investment is pervasive in the modern
international economy and, if properly utilized, is a vital component
of any developing economy. 162 In general, a host country will attempt
to harvest foreign direct investment's benefits by encouraging invest-
ment while simultaneously placing restrictions on it to reduce the neg-
ative effects that unrestricted access may have on its economy.163 The
host country will do this by imposing restrictions primarily on the
right of access to the market and on the form of foreign investment
available.1 64 In terms of access, foreign capital is primarily restrained
at three points: (1) entry of capital into the market, (2) during busi-
ness operations within the host country, or (3) upon withdrawal of
profits. 165 In addition, there are a myriad of limits on the form of
foreign direct investment, such as: (1) prohibitions in total sectors of
the host economy, (2) limits on domestic private investment, and (3)
in sectors where foreign direct investment is allowed, equity percent-
age limitations for individual projects. 166
This Comment advocates change only to the extent that the
neighbors of an occupied territory employ these general standards.
Indeed, by examining how similarly situated countries balance foreign
investors' access to their domestic market, one can ascertain how to
properly achieve occupation law's balance for an occupied territory.
Thus, the means by which an occupied territory's neighbors limit for-
(2000) (discussing foreign investment in the context of the success of the Israeli-Palestin-
ian peace process).
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
163. 2 FoLSoM, supra note 6, at 286.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 286-87.
166. Id. at 289-90.
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eign direct investment creates a lowest common denominator regard-
ing foreign investment in the given region. This lowest common
denominator would serve as a legitimate estimate of how a future
elected government would draft a foreign investment law, while also
serving as the proper check on an occupier's power. The result of this
limited authority to change the occupied territory's foreign invest-
ment law more fully achieves occupation law's fundamental balance
and is more cogent with the modern reality of occupation and inter-
national economics.
This standard would, for example, have allowed the United States
to alter Iraqi foreign investment law with some certainty in a way that
is beneficial to the Iraqi population, but that does not exceed the best
estimate of how a future elected Iraqi government would draft a for-
eign investment law. The scope of the CPA's authority to change
Iraq's foreign investment law may be determined by evaluating the
foreign investment laws of Iraq's neighbors, namely, Iran, Saudi Ara-
bia, and Jordan. Considering the political makeup of these countries,
many of which are governed by various forms of Islamic law, a view of
their foreign investment laws creates a common thread that limits an
occupier's power to change the laws of an occupied territory.
1. Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic republic, with a con-
stitution based on the precepts of Islamic law.167 The highest authority
in Iran is the "Leader," who exercises supreme political and religious
power. 168 The second highest authority is the president, who is di-
rectly elected by the people for a term of four years. 169 The Iranian
Legislature, currently called the Sixth Majlis, is a 290 member body of
popularly elected representatives. 170 All laws passed by the Majlis must
receive approval from the Council of Guardians, which is comprised
of six faqihs (clerical Islamic canonists) appointed by the Leader and
six jurists proposed by the head of the Judiciary and elected by the
167. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publi
cations/factbook/geos/ir.html (last accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
168. NETIRAN, PROFILE: LEADERSHIP (2004), at http://www.netiran.com/?fn=leader
(last accessed Sept. 21, 2004).
169. NETIRAN, PROFILE: EXECUTIVE (2004), athttp://www.netiran.com/?fn=exe (last ac-
cessed Sept. 21, 2004).
170. NETIRAN, PROFILE: LEGISLATIVE (2004), at http://www.netiran.com/?fn=legis (last
accessed Sept. 21, 2004).
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Majlis. 171 After approval by the Council of Guardians, legislation must
also be endorsed by the President.172
Despite being Iraq's most fundamentally Islamic neighbor, the
Iranian government has recently begun to actively court foreign in-
vestment. In 2002, Iran passed the Encouragement and Protection of
Foreign Investment Act ("the Act").173 The Act allows foreign invest-
ment in all sectors of the economy open to domestic private compa-
nies.174 Foreign ownership is, however, capped at twenty-five percent
of market share in any given sector of the economy and thirty-five
percent of an individual industry. 17 5 The Act provides foreign inves-
tors the same rights, support, and facilities provided domestic inves-
tors,1 7 6 and, subject to the approval of the Foreign Investment Board,
a foreign investor is free to repatriate profits earned in Iran. 177
In fact, Mohammad Khazai, head of Iran's Foreign Investment
Organization, has stated, "Drastic economic changes in the past two
decades have turned the phenomenon of globalization of trade into
an undeniable reality."17 8 Passing the Act in 2002 has significantly en-
hanced Iran's ability to attract foreign direct investment. Between pas-
sage of the Act in 2002 and June 2003, Iran attracted $3.3 billion in
foreign direct investment, comprised of forty-five projects with inves-
tors from thirty-four countries.1 79 The volume of investments in this
eighteen month period accounts for one-third of Iran's total invest-
ment during the previous decade. 180
2. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy with a constitution governed accord-
ing to Islamic law, though several secular codes have been intro-
duced.1 8 1 The 120 member Consultative Council is the Saudi
legislative body, though the King remains the final arbiter of state af-
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment Act (2002) (Iran), avail-
able at http://www.netiran.com/php/law0008.php (last accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
174. Id. at art. 3.
175. Id. at art. 2(D).
176. Id. at art. 8.
177. Id. at art. 10.
178. Mohammad Khazai, Grounds Prepared for Foreign Investment in Iran, IRN EXPORT &
IMPORT, Mar. 2004, at 32, available at http:www.netiran.com/php/artp.php?id=758 (last ac-
cessed Sept. 21, 2004).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 167.
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fairs.18 2 The Kingdom, with the largest reserves of petroleum in the
world, has an oil-based economy,1 8 3 which may resemble the economy
of a future Iraq.
The Saudi Foreign Investment Act,18 4 passed in 2000, creates a
licensing procedure that allows a foreign investor to enter the Saudi
market through joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries.18 5 A li-
censed project "enjoy[s] all the benefits, incentives, and guarantees
enjoyed by a national project."'1 6 The law allows foreign ownership of
real estate 18 7 and provides that a foreign investor can remove equity
or profits from the Kingdom. 188
Saudi Arabia has attracted nearly $12.5 billion in foreign capital
since changing its foreign investment law in 2000.189 While foreign
investment has primarily integrated into the manufacturing sector'9 0
and the services sector, 19 1 the Saudi Arabian General Investment Au-
thority has stated that it expects cumulative investments to reach
nearly $900 billion over the next twenty years. 192
3. Jordan
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy
based on Islamic law. 193 The executive power is vested in a Council of
Ministers appointed by the King, which is accountable to a two-house
parliament.194 The King appoints the forty members of the Upper
House, while the eighty deputies of the Lower House are elected by
popular vote. 195
182. SAUDI ARABIAN INFORMATION RESOURCES., CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL: AN INTRODUC-
TION (2004), at http://www.saudinf.com/main/c52.htm (last accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
183. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 167.
184. Saudi Foreign Investment Act, art. 5 (2000) (Saudi Arabia), available at http://
www.us-saudi-business.org/foreign-investment-act.htm (last accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
185. Id. at art. 5.
186. Id. at art. 6.
187. Id. at art. 5(2).
188. Id. at art. 7.
189. Saudis Attract Investors, TECHNICAL REV. MIDDLE E., Mar. 16, 2004, at *5 (on file
with U.S.F. Law Review).
190. The manufacturing sector received $8.64 billion. Id.
191. The services sector received $6.48 billion. Id.
192. Id.; see also Aramco, Sumitomo, Red Sea Refinery, MIDDLE E. OIL & GAS REv., May 9,
2004, at * 1, available at 2004 WL 55868503 (announcing plans for a major Red Sea refinery
project agreement between Saudi Aramco and Sumitomo Chemicals of Japan).
193. JORDAN FOREIGN INV. BD., ABOUTJORDAN (2004), at http://www.jordaninvestment.




UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
The Investment Promotion Law of 1995196 eased restrictions on
foreign corporate ownership in Jordan.19 7 The law reduced bureau-
cratic impediments and regulatory procedures and thus was a major
step in creating the administrative and policy framework needed to
attract foreign investment. 198 The new foreign investment law allows
foreign investment in all projects and sectors,199 removing the fifty
percent ceiling on foreign equity ownership in certain sectors, 200
while reducing minimum capital requirements. 20' Additionally, inves-
tors may repatriate capital and profits at their discretion. 20 2 Finally,
foreign companies are free to open branch offices in Jordan once they
have obtained a contract.203
The increase in foreign investment accompanying the liberaliza-
tion ofJordan's foreign investment law is the most pronounced of the
mentioned countries. The Jordanian government reports that foreign
direct investment rose from $627 million in 1995 to $2.4 billion in
2002.204
D. Lowest Common Denominator for Iraq
Under this new interpretation of Article 43, the foreign invest-
ment laws of Iran, Saudi Arabia, andJordan would have helped define
the scope of the CPA's authority to alter Iraq's foreign investment law.
Indeed, each of Iraq's three neighbors has enacted new, more liberal
foreign investment laws attempting to attract foreign investors. 20 5 The
196. Investment Promotion Law (1995) (Jordan), available at http://www.jordanemb
assyus.org/new/commercial/laws/investmentpromotion.shtml (last accessed Sept. 6,
2004).
197. See id.
198. Reem Badran,Jordan is Attracting Foreign Direct Investment, 2 THE ARAB BANK REV. 23
(2000), available at http://arabbank.com/review/vol2/jordon-is-attracting-foreign-direct
_investment.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2004).
199. Investment Promotion Law, art. 3 (1995) (Jordan), available at http://www.jordan
embassyus.org/new/commercial/laws/investmentpromotion.shtml (last accessed Sept. 6,
2004).
200. JoRDAN FOREIGN INv. BD., FAQs (2000), at http://www.jordaninvestment.com/
faqs.htm (last accessed Sept. 21, 2004). The fifty percent ownership ceiling remains in the
mining, construction, contracting, and retail and trade services sectors. Id.
201. Investment Promotion Law, supra note 199, at art. 6.
202. Id. at art. 9.
203. ARAB DATANET, FOREIGN INVESTMENT (June 2003), at http://www.arabdatanet.
com/country/profiles/profile.asp?CtryName=Jordan&CtryAbrv=jo&Navitle=Foreign%20
Investment (last accessed Sept. 21, 2004).
204. U.S., Kuwait Sign Trade, Investment Framework Agreement, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb.
6, 2004 (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
205. See UNCTAD, FDI PERFORMANCE INDEX 1999-2001, http://www.unctad.org/Tem
plates/WebFlyer.asp?inttemD=2471&lang=I (last accessed May 14, 2004). This index,
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common themes that emerge from analyzing the three are, in the
end, more similar to Order 39 than to the Iraqi Companies Law of
1997. These revised foreign investment laws create much more liberal
access to foreign investors in their respective domestic markets than
was allowed by Hussein's regime. Coupled with the importance of for-
eign investment in occupied territories, as revealed by the laws en-
acted in Kosovo and Afghanistan, these laws also form a compelling
argument that, under this new interpretation of Article 43 analyzing a
lowest common denominator, Order 39 would be a "permitted" regu-
lation and thus honored by an elected Iraqi government.
First, both Order 39 and the modern foreign investment laws do
not require certification of compliance with the Arab Boycott of
Israel. Second, under each of these laws, foreign investors receive "na-
tional treatment"-meaning non-Arab foreign corporations receive
the same treatment under the law as domestic corporations-in both
access to contracts and protection of those contracts in domestic
courts. Third, the laws permit full foreign ownership as a founder,
shareholder, or partner in all but a few sectors of the host state's econ-
omy. Each country limits access to various sectors such as mining or
natural resource exploration or, as in Iran, foreign ownership is
capped in every sector. Finally, foreign investors may repatriate their
capital or their profits derived from the investment.
These threads running through Iraq's neighbors' foreign invest-
ment laws do not differ significantly from Order 39. Any foreign in-
vestment law passed by a sovereign Iraqi government is likely to
resemble these basic characteristics. Order 39 allows for national treat-
ment of foreign investors, full foreign ownership in all sectors except
natural resources, banking, and insurance, and full repatriation of
profits. However, because under Article 43 the CPA's authority to en-
act such laws remains uncertain, this parallel is only secondarily im-
portant to foreign investors who are unsure of which law should guide
their decision of when and how to invest in Iraq following the war.
The proposed lowest common denominator interpretation of Ar-
ticle 43 would alleviate many of these concerns. Foreign investors
would be able to rely on the standards of Order 39 when negotiating
their legal obligations with Iraqi companies, whether state-run or pri-
vate. To the extent that Order 39 extends beyond the norms of the
surrounding countries-perhaps in its failure to reserve a certain per-
which ranks foreign direct investment performance from 1999-2001 in 140 economies
throughout the world, shows Jordan at 54, Iran at 131, and Saudi Arabia at 135. Id.
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centage of a given industry for domestic ownership for example-for-
eign investors can self-regulate in order to insulate their risk. At the
very least, clear guideposts would be created that would allow an inves-
tor to make a risk/reward determination and trust that the law that
guided their contractual obligations will also guide any dispute that
arises.
This interpretation also strikes the proper balance that occupa-
tion law requires. At first blush, Order 39 seems a complete overhaul
of Iraqi foreign investment law, contrary to any precept of limiting an
occupier's power. Taken within the context of the laws governing
Iraq's neighbors, however, Order 39 does not seem like such a striking
departure from the prevailing norms of the region. The result is a
limit on the CPA's lawmaking power and the creation of a clear legal
regime regulating foreign investment that guides foreign investors'
decisions and makes the risk of the Iraqi market more tolerable. This
is unquestionably a benefit to the Iraqi population as it develops a
modern economy from the ruins of Hussein's regime.
Conclusion
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. Thus, a system of
law, like occupation law, that is failing to achieve this end should not
be blindly accepted and sustained. Clearly it is not the purpose of oc-
cupation law to be an obstacle to an occupied territory's development.
Yet, as the current situation in Iraq illustrates, this is precisely what the
law has become. To return occupation law to its proper balance of
restraining an occupier while empowering the occupied population,
the doctrine must alter its interpretation of Article 43 of the Hague
Convention. An occupying power must have limited authority to
change an occupied territory's foreign investment law. This limit may
be deduced from a lowest common denominator gleaned from the
foreign investment laws of neighboring countries. Given the trans-
formational purposes of modern occupation and the pervasiveness of
foreign direct investment in developing economies, allowing an occu-
pying interim government to change foreign investment law is a signif-
icant step in empowering an occupied population. That, in the end, is
occupation law's purpose.
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